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Abstract
The penal system has played a central role in the North Korean government’s response to the country’s profound 
economic and social changes. As the informal market economy has expanded, so have the scope of economic crimes. 
Two refugee surveys—one conducted in China, one in South Korea—document that the regime disproportionately 
targets politically suspect groups, particularly those involved in market-oriented economic activities. Levels of violence 
and deprivation do not appear to differ substantially between the infamous political prison camps, penitentiaries for 
felons, and labor camps used to incarcerate individuals for a growing number of economic crimes. Such a system 
may also reflect ulterior motives. High levels of discretion with respect to arrest and sentencing and very high costs of 
detention, arrest, and incarceration encourage bribery; the more arbitrary and painful the experience with the penal 
system, the easier it is for officials to extort money for avoiding it. These characteristics not only promote regime 
maintenance through intimidation, but may facilitate predatory corruption as well.
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During the 1990s, a famine in North Korea killed between 600,000 and 1,000,000 people, 3 to 5 percent 
of the population (Haggard and Noland 2007). As the state proved unable to provide food through the 
socialist distribution network, the economy underwent a process of marketization from below. Small-scale 
social units—households, factories and cooperatives, local government and party offices, even military 
units—engaged in entrepreneurial behavior in order to survive. Much of this behavior was technically 
illegal. 
This unplanned and unwanted marketization resulted from the coping strategies of citizens and 
was not overtly political. But it also eroded state control of the economy and therefore over pathways 
to wealth, prestige, and ultimately power; it even threatened to create an independent civil society 
around unregulated market relations. Not surprisingly, the regime’s response to this process has been 
ambivalent at best. At times, the government acquiesced to the facts on the ground and decriminalized 
or tolerated market activity out of sheer necessity. At other times, the government sought to reconstitute 
the socialist system through a revival of the state sector and the imposition of controls on private activity, 
most recently through a confiscatory currency reform announced on November 30, 2009 (Haggard and 
Noland 2010a).
The penal system has played a central role in the government’s response to these economic and 
social changes. During the famine, the regime established an extensive system of low-level labor training 
facilities (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae). These facilities were used to incarcerate those caught crossing the 
border into China or repatriated by Chinese authorities, movements that increased in the wake of the 
famine. However, labor-training facilities were also used to punish the unprecedented level of internal 
movement and market activity that sprung up as heavily affected segments of the population wandered 
the countryside in search of food (Noland 2000).
The 2004 reform of the criminal code regularized these facilities and specified “labor training” 
for up to two years as punishment for a growing number of economic and social crimes (Han 2006). A 
further set of amendments to the criminal code in 2007 lengthened the list of these crimes and increased 
punishments for them. 
We draw on two refugee surveys—one conducted in China, the other in South Korea—to draw 
a picture of the changing political economy of the North Korean penal system. Respondents portray a 
judicial and penal system characterized by high rates of arbitrary detention and release. Horrific abuses are 
characteristic not only of the camps for political prisoners, but are found at all levels of the penal system. 
In the survey of more than 1,300 refugees conducted in China between August 2004 and September 
2005, nearly 10 percent reported incarceration in political and correctional detention facilities. Among 
this group, 90 percent reported witnessing forced starvation, 60 percent deaths due to beating or torture, 
and 27 percent executions. These findings are broadly confirmed by a second survey of 300 refugees 
conducted in South Korea in November 2008, which also included more detailed questions about initial 
arrest and detention, the types of facilities in which respondents were held, and the conditions they 
witnessed while incarcerated. 
The emerging portrait of the North Korean penal system suggests a vast machine that processes 
large numbers of people engaged in illicit activities for relatively short periods, but which exposes them 
to terrible abuses while incarcerated. This pattern serves to effectively intimidate; our surveys reveal an 
atomized society in which barriers to collective action are high and overt political opposition minimal. 
However, repression has not served to eliminate market-oriented activity, in part because of the 
continuing poor economic performance of the regime. Rather, our surveys suggest a changing political 
economy in which corrupt officials extract bribes from those in the market, exploiting their ability to limit 
entanglement with a brutal penal system.
Methodologically, refugee surveys are susceptible to well-known problems of selection bias. Those 
who undertake the risks of trying to leave North Korea may have more adverse experiences with the 
regime, which could give rise to behaviors and attitudes that are quite different from the population as a 
whole. Because crossing the border has historically been seen as a very serious crime, those incarcerated 
for attempting to exit could have faced particularly severe punishment. The survey may thus accurately 
capture the experiences of the refugee communities in China and South Korea, but provide only a limited 
perspective on North Korea.1
However, there are some reasons to believe that the sources of bias are somewhat less pronounced 
than might be thought. We can also reduce at least some sources of bias with multivariate statistical 
techniques that control for possible demographic or even experiential determinants of political attitudes. 
Refugees are asked questions not only about their own experience but their observation of others’ 
experiences as well. Refugees’ experience with the prison system may also not be unique. There is strong 
evidence that the punishment of border crossing now resembles the punishment of a widening array of 
other economic and social crimes associated with the growth of markets. 
We begin with a brief overview of the North Korean penal system before turning to a descriptive 
overview of respondents’ experiences with it. A striking finding is that the conditions that are frequently 
seen as characteristic of the country’s infamous gulag of political penal-labor colonies—such as extreme 
deprivation and exposure to violence—in fact pertain across the penal system, including the work camps 
established to handle lower-level economic crimes. 
We then explore some of the determinants of incarceration. The repressive apparatus 
1. A second, more tractable issue is that the population of refugees may not be demographically representative of the 
resident, nonrefugee population, overrepresenting particular segments of the population such as women or people from 
particular occupational categories. Chang, Haggard, and Noland (2009b) and Haggard and Noland (2010b) show that 
this source of potential bias is negligible.
disproportionately targets those involved in economic activities beyond direct state control, at a rate 
more than half again as high as the general population. These findings are consistent with the expansive 
definition of economic crime contained in the 2004 and 2007 changes in the North Korean criminal 
code. In the last two sections, we use the surveys to provide a more detailed analysis of the emerging 
North Korean political economy, noting the effectiveness of repression in stilling overt dissent but its 
inability to eradicate market activity and corruption. 
The NorTh KoreAN PeNAl SySTem
In the last decade, a variety of sources have allowed analysts to piece together a picture of North Korea’s 
penal system. Satellite imagery, including images secured through providers such as DigitalGlobe 
and Google Earth, have permitted a precise mapping of the country’s gulag. Yet at the core of our 
understanding is information provided by refugees who have managed to flee North Korea. This 
information has appeared in the form of memoirs, unstructured interviews, and databases of human 
rights violations (Kang 2002, Hawk 2003, Muico 2007, KINU 2009, and Database Center for North 
Korean Human Rights 2008). 
The portrait that emerges from the refugee literature is of a Soviet-style gulag characterized by an 
arbitrary judicial system, an expansive conception of crime, and widespread abuse including extreme 
deprivation with respect to food and medical treatment, torture, and public executions. But the penal 
system is by no means limited to the political prison camps. As is true of all authoritarian systems, North 
Korea has a complex and differentiated set of penal institutions. A striking feature of this system is the 
growing incarceration of citizens for economic crimes. 
The most notorious component of the North Korean prison system is the massive kwan-li-so, 
variously translated as political prison camps, labor colonies, or concentration camps; we will refer to 
them as political penal-labor camps. Built to incarcerate those guilty or suspected of political crimes, 
the number of these massive camps has recently been consolidated from 14 to about 5 sites.2 With one 
exception, these camps are administered by the National Security Agency (NSA), an agency with wide-
ranging external and internal security functions that include border and immigration control.3 
The politically suspect initially included counterrevolutionary social forces such as landlords, the 
religiously active, and members of purged political factions. Over time, it came to encompass anyone 
guilty of political or ideological crimes or even suspected of disloyalty. Those with extensive knowledge 
of life outside North Korea have been particularly vulnerable to incarceration in these facilities, including 
2. One camp (Camp 22 near the Chinese border) is estimated to be 31 miles long and 25 miles wide and to hold 50,000 
inmates (Harden 2009).
3. A useful summary of the history and functions of the NSA can be found in Min (2007). 
repatriated Japanese-Koreans, those who have studied abroad, and those accused of trafficking people out 
of North Korea.
A distinctive feature of the management of political crimes is that there is little pretense of due 
process. Political crimes appear to fall outside of criminal statute altogether and are managed with a high 
level of discretion by the NSA. The NSA either apprehends those accused of political crimes directly or 
they are remanded to NSA custody (Muico 2007). Once a case is deemed political, the National Security 
Agency also assumes control of the prosecutorial process. A prosecutor from the NSA will hand down 
sentences in a closed-door local court session in the name of the Central Court in Pyongyang, including 
the decision of whether to imprison the criminal for life and whether the criminal’s family will also be 
sent with him. Group punishment in the form of incarceration of extended family and confiscation of 
property is a distinctive feature of the management of political crimes and incarceration in the political 
penal-labor camps.  
Inmates of the kwan-li-so are typically incarcerated under prolonged or lifetime sentences at hard 
labor in mining, logging, and farming enterprises in the highly inhospitable north and north-central part 
of the country. Prisoners are also kept on starvation rations and many die of malnutrition and disease. 
Not surprisingly, the number of escapees from these camps is small; of the 300 refugees interviewed in the 
2008 South Korea-based survey, only three report internments in a kwan-li-so.4
In addition to political crimes, the legal and penal system has also had to cope with an explosion 
of economic and social crimes that are peculiar to a state-socialist system. These crimes ultimately reflect 
the inability of the state sector to provide employment and basic necessities, and include efforts on the 
part of households, and even work and military units, to engage in income-earning activities. From the 
perspective of the regime, however, these activities can pose political as well as economic challenges. For 
example, people engaged in unauthorized private enterprise and trading do not show up at their work 
units and thus evade monitoring. Their activities are also difficult to tax. As a result, authorities have 
incentives to punish both failure to appear at work and the associated private activity. 
Illegal movement is also an important feature of the new economy, including leaving one’s 
home without appropriate travel permits, overstaying travel permits or leaving the country without 
authorization. This last offense is of obvious significance to our consideration of refugees, as many seeking 
to leave are either caught in transit or apprehended by Chinese authorities and forcibly repatriated. Yet 
internal movement without a permit, for example with the objective of trading, is also illegal.
4. Unfortunately, we have no information on the conditions under which these three were either released or escaped, but 
curiously the length of their incarceration does not differ significantly from that of the other respondents: one reported 
incarceration between one and five years, one of less than a year, but one reported being in a kwan-li-so for less than a 
week. It is clearly difficult to draw inferences from three respondents, although the survivor testimony from these camps 
on these issues is now fairly extensive. See particularly Hawk (2003).
More serious economic crimes include diversion of state output to private use, including food 
grown on cooperatives, and the illegal use, profiteering from, or even sale of state assets. Some economic 
crimes are managed through administrative punishments at the level of the work unit, but an increasing 
number of economic crimes move through the criminal justice system. In the 1999 criminal code, the 
“Chapter on Offenses against the Management of the Socialist Economy” included eight articles. In 
2004, it was re-titled “the Chapter on Offenses against the Management of the Economy” and included 
seventy-four. 
If taken literally, these crimes prohibit a wide array of standard commercial activities and thus leave 
prosecutors substantial discretion. For example, Articles 110 and 111 of the 2004 criminal code provide 
for up to two years of labor training for individuals and firms who engage in “illegal commercial activities, 
therefore gaining large profits.” Article 118 extends similar punishment to “gaining large profits through 
usury.” Article 119 prohibits “illegally giving money or goods in exchange for labor.” Violations of trade 
and foreign exchange controls receive particularly detailed attention (Articles 105-107; 116-117; 125-
126). 
It is noteworthy that this revision of the criminal code came only two years after the initiation of 
the country’s most significant economic reform initiative in 2002. In 2007, a series of “additional clauses” 
(bu-chik) singled out a number of economic crimes for more severe punishment, including fixed prisons 
terms and even death. Capital punishment was to be meted out for “extreme cases” of theft of state 
property and drug dealing, but increased punishments were also given for “illegally operating a business, 
such as a restaurant, motel, or store,” up to and including the death penalty (for running prostitution 
rings). We can only assume that these activities are being criminalized because they are in fact taking 
place.
Incarceration for standard criminal offenses, as well as these new economic crimes, is distributed 
through the penal system. In addition to the political penal-labor camps, the government also maintains 
the kyo-hwa-so—literally, a “place to make someone better through education”—and sometimes 
translated as correctional or reeducation centers. In fact, there is little evidence that these facilities 
perform correctional or reeducation functions. Superficially, they resemble prisons for housing felons 
and are administered by the People’s Safety Agency, the national police force; we will refer to them as 
penitentiaries. However, there are predictable differences with penitentiaries in other penal systems. First, 
the definition of felony crimes in North Korea includes a range of activities that appear political rather 
than criminal: “antistate, antipeople crimes,” “crimes injurious to socialist culture,” and so on (table 1). 
Hawk describes the case of a woman imprisoned in a kyo-hwa-so penitentiary who had been convicted 
of disturbing the “socialist order” for singing a South Korean pop song in a private home (Hawk 2003 
pg. 46). As in the political penal-labor camps (kwan-li-so), prisoners in the kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries are 
compelled to perform hard labor and refugees with experience in them report that they are subjected to 
brutal treatment and torture and deprived of adequate food and medical care. Many inmates do not live 
to serve out their sentences and escape may even be more difficult than from the sprawling political penal-
labor camps (Hawk 2003, Muico 2007, KINU 2009 pgs. 97–101). In the 2008 survey, 9 percent of 
those incarcerated report spending time in a kyo-hwa-so penitentiary.  
The third and fourth components of the North Korean penal system manage lower-level crimes 
and misdemeanors. The jip-kyul-so or “collection centers” house low- or misdemeanor-level criminals for 
periods of up to six months of hard labor. As a study by the Korean Institute of National Unification 
describes this level of the penal system, “the cases handled by ‘collection centers’ include those whose 
crimes are not serious enough for [kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries] but too serious to send off to ‘labor training 
camps (KINU 2009 pg 95).’” Examples would include violating a designated or restricted area or 
overstaying travel permits, but the KINU report also lists absence from work or group training sessions. 
Some North Koreans forcibly repatriated from China are also transferred to the jip-kyul-so collection 
centers. 
Finally, in addition to the collection centers for incarceration for lower-level offenses there has been 
an explosive growth of ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae or labor-training centers, a network of facilities that dates 
to the 1990s. The labor-training centers were not initially a statutory feature of the penal system. Rather, 
they emerged as an ad hoc response on the part of authorities to the fraying of socialist control during the 
famine and in its immediate aftermath, including unauthorized movement, black market activity, border-
crossing and the other economic crimes listed above (Noland 2000). 
The ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor-training centers are operated at the municipal level. They constitute 
mobile labor brigades of relatively small numbers of prisoners—30 to 60—typically held for less than 
six months in small, minimally-guarded and fenceless compounds. If not apprehended locally, these 
prisoners have already been through interrogations and been shipped back to their hometowns for final 
release. Sometimes the detainees in the labor-training centers are even allowed to go to their homes for 
food or to recover from illness. Detainees do road repair, construction, and substitute for the lack of other 
forms of energy and transport in the face of shortages, for example, by pushing train cars. 
From 2001, this sort of labor training emerged as the preferred sentence for dealing not only with 
petty crimes but for the growing range of economic crimes as well. In the 2004 revision of the penal code 
described above “labor training” was explicitly introduced as a new form of punishment and the existence 
of the ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor training centers therefore institutionalized (Han 2006 and KINU 2009 
pg. 90). 
Labor-training centers have played a particularly important role in the management of those caught 
crossing the border or repatriated from China (Muico 2007). Leaving the country without permission 
was initially considered equivalent to treason. The 1999 criminal law revision acknowledged the economic 
motives for departure, and distinguished such movement from defectors leaving for “subversive” 
purposes. Traveling abroad without permission remains a crime in the 2004 penal code, which provides 
for penalties up to and including death if such activity has a national security or antiregime dimension 
(Article 62). However, Article 223 of the revised penal code of 2004 permits sentences of up to two years 
in a ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor training center. 
Initial screening of repatriated North Koreans typically includes extensive questioning at special 
National Security Agency detention facilities about contact with South Koreans while in China or 
exposure to South Korean propaganda, broadcasts, movies or music; those involved in these more serious 
political offenses are liable to incarceration in kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries or even the kwan-li-so political 
penal-labor camps. The NSA retains discretion to either release those involved in border crossing after 
initial detention, which can last up to several months, or release them to the People’s Safety Agency for 
incarceration in locally-managed collection centers (jip-kyul-so) or labor training centers (ro-dong-dan-
ryeon-dae). 
Incarceration in these two types of lower-level facilities was by far the most common form of 
contact with the penal system among our respondents. Of the 102 South Korea–based survey respondents 
who reported some incarceration, 49 reported spending time in a labor-training center and 68, or 23 
percent of the entire 300-person sample, reported being detained in collection centers. 
Table 2 summarizes the nature of the four main penal institutions including their administration, 
the nature of the offenses, the prosecutorial process and sentencing, and the number of respondents in 
our 2008 survey of South Korea-based refugees falling into each institution. Particularly noteworthy is 
the porous line between political and criminal activities and the wide range of activities that are subject to 
labor training under the revised criminal code (table 1). 
Who GeTS ArreSTed ANd ImPrISoNed?
The first point of contact with the legal and penal system in North Korea is typically either with the 
National Security Agency (NSA) or the People’s Security Agency (PSA), although ad hoc “antisocialist 
inspection units” have also recently been deployed to deal with border crossing and trafficking as well as 
economic crimes. The NSA deals with political offenses and conducts the first screening process of those 
apprehended for border crossing or repatriated by Chinese authorities. 
The risks of repatriation in China are great (Kurlantzick and Mason 2006).5 However, some of 
those repatriated are engaged in economic activities that require even higher risk movement back and 
5. Refugees detained by Chinese authorities are also subject to abuse and even torture prior to repatriation. See Amnesty 
International (2000, 2001, and 2004) and Lee (2006). 
forth across the border. About one-fifth of the respondents in the China survey had returned to North 
Korea voluntarily, with the overwhelming reason cited to take money or food back (79 percent and 11 
percent of those returning, respectively). Quite naturally, those who were repatriated were incarcerated at 
a significantly higher rate than those who returned voluntarily. 
This analysis is extended in table 3, which reports a multivariate probit analysis of the likelihood 
of being arrested among respondents in the second, South Korea–based survey. The probability of being 
arrested is highly correlated with involvement in private market activities; indeed, involvement in such 
activities generates a more than 50 percent increase in the likelihood of arrest. Detention is associated to a 
lesser extent with participation in an August 3rd unit, a form of entrepreneurial activity operated through 
existing state-owned enterprises and other officially sanctioned entities (Haggard and Noland 2010b). 
These findings are consistent with the regime’s expansive definition of economic crime.
Among this sample of refugees, the likelihood of being arrested is also positively associated with 
having an advanced, post-college education, even when controlling for occupation; being a professional 
was negatively correlated with probability of arrest, but with a smaller estimated impact. One possibility 
is that those with higher levels of education are better positioned than others to pursue illicit activities, 
and thus run higher risks of incarceration. Another possibility is that the regime is more sensitive to the 
activities of the intelligentsia than other social groups. Intriguingly, being assigned to a military unit is 
associated with a higher probability of being arrested in this sample, although the number of military 
respondents was small (16). 
Despite the ubiquity of “basic” illicit activities such as market trading, it is striking that laborers and 
housewives were less likely to be arrested, even though the involvement of housewives in the market is 
widespread and increasingly well documented (Kim and Dalton 2006). This fact may reflect at least some 
forbearance on the part of the government where market activities are small scale or part time and seen as 
serving primarily survival purposes. 
The North Korean regime has conducted a succession of classification exercises, dividing the 
population into a class of reliable supporters, the basic masses, and the “impure class”; in the past, these 
were known as the “core” (haek-sim-gun-jung), “wavering” (gi-bon-gye-cheung) and “hostile” (gyo-yang-
dae-sang) classes. Family class background is a key determinant of life in North Korea.6 There is modest 
evidence that being a member of the “wavering” class was positively correlated with likelihood of arrest 
relative to both the “core” and “hostile” classes.
6. “Core” supporters of the government, including party members, enjoy educational and employment preferences, are 
allowed to live in better-off areas, and have greater access to food and other material goods. Those with a “hostile” or 
disloyal profile, such as relatives of people who collaborated with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation, landowners, 
or those who went south during the Korean War, are subjected to a number of disadvantages: they are assigned to the 
worst schools, jobs, and localities and sometimes wind up in labor camps. See Hunter (1999). 10
To what extent have patterns of arrest changed over time? Regressions 3.2–3.4 include dummy 
variables marking the period that refugees left North Korea. We call the pre-1999 period the famine era; 
1999–2002 as the post-famine period; 2003–05 as the post-reform period; and 2006–present as the post-
retrenchment period, signifying the apparent reversal of economic reform that has occurred since 2005. 
Using the year that respondents left North Korea is at best an indirect means of assessing whether arrest 
patterns have changed in response to these events, since incarceration is only imperfectly related to time 
of departure. Nonetheless, the coefficients on these time period dummies are statistically insignificant; 
there is no variation in the likelihood of incarceration over time. This could be because the respondent’s 
date of exit is simply too imprecise a measure to get at changes in penal practices over time. However, 
the government’s overall propensity to incarcerate may also be unchanged, even if certain forms of 
punishment such as labor training have become more institutionalized over time. 
In short, there is evidence that the authorities disproportionately incarcerate those involved in 
economic activities beyond direct state control, those with higher education, and those in the “wavering” 
class. However, the strategy of intimidation is not simply related to detention and incarceration, but what 
happens to inmates once imprisoned.
The NATure of PuNIShmeNT
Perhaps due to a desire to conform—at least superficially—to international norms, revisions of the legal 
code have gradually included a number of standard legal protections.7 Habeas corpus was introduced 
in the 1998 revision to the constitution. The 2004 criminal procedure law stipulates that “no one shall 
be arrested or detained in a manner not provided for in the law or without following the procedures 
prescribed in the law (Article 177).” The law also now stipulates that no arrest shall be made without a 
warrant; that only investigators and “pretrial agents” can make an arrest (Article 180); and that a pretrial 
agent making an arrest must apply for and receive preapproval from a prosecutor (Article 181). A number 
of provisions in the 2004 criminal code revision even outline harsh penalties for those violating rules 
governing arrest, detention, search, and seizure. 
A similar set of provisions appear to pertain with respect to the criminal trial process. The National 
Security Agency retains significant discretion with respect to all political crimes, but revisions of the 
7. The regime has vehemently rejected the actions of the UN Council on Human Rights, a political body subsidiary to the 
General Assembly that since 2003 has passed annual resolutions on North Korea’s human rights record.  The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has also refused to meet with special rapporteurs or the high commissioner for human 
rights. North Korea takes a different stance toward the UN Human Rights Committee, however, a “treaty body” or 
technical committee that reviews implementation reports on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
DPRK submits such implementation reports and sends representatives to the review sessions of these bodies. Some recent 
legal changes appear to have been undertaken to bring North Korean law into nominal conformity with international 
standards.11
Criminal Procedure Law in 2004 and 2005 stipulate that “all criminal cases shall follow the principles, 
procedures, and methods stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Law” and that “trials be conducted at 
appropriate levels of court and the punishment levels shall be determined by court decisions.” 
These legal and procedural changes do not seem to matter. Of the 102 respondents in the 2008 
survey who had been incarcerated, only 13 reported even receiving a trial at all. Although the numbers are 
small, this share does not change significantly among those who left after 2005, following the revision of 
the code; of 25 leaving after that date, 3 (12 percent) report receiving a trial but 22 (88 percent) did not. 
Moreover, the absence of a trial and conviction was by no means limited to those cases that ended 
up with detention in the political penal-labor camps (kwan-li-so) and penitentiaries (kyo-hwa-so). To the 
contrary, the share of those reporting that they did not receive trials and convictions was even higher in 
the lower-level penal institutions: 86 percent of those incarcerated in the labor training centers (ro-dong-
dan-ryeon-dae) and 91 percent of those who served time in the collection centers (jip-kyul-so). The North 
Korean legal and penal system clearly retains an extraordinary level of discretion not only with respect to 
political crimes, but with respect to lower-level infractions such as economic crimes as well. 
Discretion appears to be exercised not only with respect to detention, but with respect to release 
as well. Given the duration of statutory sentences we expected that those incarcerated would have spent 
a long time in prison. This did not prove to be the case (table 4). Average time in prison is certainly 
longer for the political penal-labor camps and the kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries; although the numbers in our 
sample are very small, the lengthy sentences for political crimes are well known. But the information on 
collection centers (jip-kyul-so) and labor training centers (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae) is suggestive. Virtually 
all of those incarcerated in the labor training centers are held for less than a year, even though sentencing 
guidelines typically allow holding prisoners for up to two years. Sixty-three percent of those incarcerated 
in the so-called collection centers (jip-kyul-so) were released within a month. 
There is much about this system that we do not understand. It is possible that inmates are escaping 
or bribing their way out of detention. However, this information is consistent with a model of a police 
state in which authorities have a high level of discretion in detaining, arresting and prosecuting people, 
but also a high level of discretion in their ability to release them. 
One reason that such a model might be effective is because the conditions in the facilities are 
designed to have a powerful deterrent and even psychological impact, in effect terrorizing those who 
are detained. Nearly one-quarter of the sample in the initial China-based survey reported having been 
arrested in China and repatriated to North Korea. Nearly 10 percent of the respondents reported having 
been incarcerated in a political detention facility or penitentiary.8 Ninety percent of this group reported 
8. Specifically, we asked whether they had been detained in either a penitentiary (kyo-hwa-so) or other detention facility for 
political prisoners (jung-chi-bum su-yong-so); the objective was to also capture the NSA’s detention facilities. This wording 1
witnessing forced starvation, 60 percent reported witnessing deaths due to beating or torture, and 27 
percent reported witnessing executions. 
The China survey did not differentiate these experiences by the precise type of penal institution, but 
this was a focus of the 2008 South Korea–based survey. Table 5 shows the share of respondents by level 
of penal institution who witnessed executions, forced starvation, deaths from beatings or torture, or the 
killing of newborns. The pattern of responses is quite similar to that obtained in the earlier survey: a high 
response rate with respect to generalized forms of abuse, a much lower response rate on the highly specific 
question on infanticide, lending that respondents are not simply providing interviewers with information 
that they would like to hear.
What is striking about these findings is the ubiquity of violence and deprivation across the different 
initial points of contact with authorities and various levels of the prison system. The small number of 
respondents with experience in the political penal-labor camps—and the short-time one respondent was 
incarcerated in one—prohibit any firm conclusions about them from our survey, although the record 
with respect to these institutions has now been thoroughly documented (Kang 2002 and Hawk 2003). 
But the findings with respect to lower levels of the prison system are even more striking. In both 
the lower-level criminal facilities (the jip-kyul-so collection centers) and the labor training centers, nearly 
half of respondents report seeing executions, roughly three-quarters report forced starvation, and nearly a 
third report witnessing deaths from beatings and torture. These levels of violence are witnessed despite the 
generally shorter periods of incarceration in these lower-level facilities. The mean period of incarceration 
in both types of facility was in the range of one month to one year. Prisoners experiencing this typical 
length of incarceration in a jip-kyul-so collection center witnessed abuses at the following rates: executions 
(75 percent), forced starvation (100 percent), and death by torture and beatings (50 percent). For the 
labor training centers incarceration for the typical period of time was associated with observing abuses at 
slightly lower rates: execution (60 percent), forced starvation (90 percent), and death by torture or beating 
(20 percent). The conclusion is clear: even at these lower-level facilities, inmates are exposed to extreme 
levels of abuse. It is not surprising that other research has found that incarceration of North Korean 
refugees is highly correlated with psychological distress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder (Chang, 
Haggard, and Noland 2009a).
rePreSSIoN, ColleCTIve ACTIoN, ANd The STATe-mArKeT NexuS
Not surprisingly, the refugees in both surveys hold overwhelming negative attitudes toward the 
incumbent regime. In the more recent survey of refugees in South Korea nearly 87 percent of the 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the Kim Jong-il regime was getting 
would leave out the so-called collection centers and labor training centers, but the wording of the earlier questionnaire was 
vulnerable to the interpretation of respondent.1
better. More than 90 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement 
that the economy was improving, citing rising materialism (92 percent), corruption (87 percent) and 
inequality (84 percent) as problems. 
Respondents also show an increasing propensity over time to hold the North Korean government 
accountable for the country’s problems, with the share placing primary responsibility on the North 
Korean government at more than 95 percent among those who left in the post-retrenchment period (i.e., 
after 2005). The share citing the policies of foreign governments as a source of the country’s difficulties—
a core claim of the regime—falls steadily from 18 percent among the famine era leavers, to 4 percent in 
the post-retrenchment group. 
What about the political preferences of the refugees? The respondents were asked three questions 
regarding the political organization of the Korean peninsula. They were first asked which alternative 
more accurately represented their views while in North Korea: maintenance of the current North Korean 
government; installation of a new non-Kim Il-sungist government in North Korea; unification with 
South Korea (presumably under South Korean leadership given their negative perceptions of the regime 
in the north); or don’t know/none of the above. In addition to their own views at the time of departure, 
respondents were also asked what they believed now and what they believed the preferences of other 
North Koreans were. 
Unification is supported overwhelmingly (figure 1): not only is there little support for the 
maintenance of the status quo (only a single respondent out of 300), there is little support for “third 
way” solutions in which North Korea would remain independent under an alternative political regime. 
Exposure to South Korea intensifies these preferences at the margin. But the respondents also indicate 
that their own views mirror those of their peers remaining in North Korea, even though there is obviously 
no way of judging the accuracy of these claims. There is a slight tendency for these views to be held even 
more strongly among those who have recently exited North Korea.
That the refugee population is disaffected, holds the government accountable, and prefers regime 
change in North Korea is not surprising. However, the survey casts important light on the effectiveness of 
repression and the possibilities for collective action as well. 
The share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that the government is increasing restrictions 
on the citizenry remained relatively constant at 55 to 65 percent across all four subsample periods. 
Nonetheless, a rising share of respondents and a majority of the final, post-retrenchment era subsample 
report watching or listening to foreign media. Even more striking is that efforts to curtail the flow of 
information do not seem to be working. A falling share (nil in the post-retrenchment period) report that 
they have access to foreign media but decline to watch or listen. Not only is foreign media becoming 
more widely available, inhibitions on its consumption are declining as well.
Exposure to the penal system and the political police is correlated with consumption of foreign 1
media and news at the 5 percent level of statistical significance. Admittedly the direction of causality is 
debatable; we cannot tell whether the system is correctly identifying those engaged in politically deviant 
behavior or contact with the system actually politicizes the respondent (although either finding would 
be consistent with our analysis). It is nonetheless notable that the minority who reported that they had 
formal legal proceedings prior to incarceration had significantly more positive assessments of the regime 
than the majority that did not, at least suggesting that treatment at the hands of authorities may be 
shaping attitudes rather than the other way around.  
Holding negative attitudes or engaging in illicit behavior does not mean that people are willing to 
communicate their disaffection with others. The share affirming the statement that people make jokes 
about the government, while rising, never exceeds 45 percent in any of the subsamples, and the share 
agreeing with the statement that people complain about the government never reaches 40 percent. Even 
among an unusually disaffected subgroup of the population—refugees—and despite their overwhelmingly 
negative assessment of the regime, less than half of the sample report that their peers joked or complained 
about the government. (Again, exposure to the political police increases the statistical likelihood that the 
respondent reports joking about the government among his or her peers.) 
Kim Jong-il appears sacrosanct. Although free discussion of Kim rises steadily among those who left 
the country after 1998, even among those who fled during the post-retrenchment period, only 8 percent 
of the respondents report that people spoke freely about Kim Jong-il.
What about collective action? In response to the regime’s efforts to control markets, there have 
been occasional reports of incidents in which market traders, mostly women, have publicly protested 
such restraints (Martin and Takayama 2008). As previously discussed, involvement with the market is 
correlated with the likelihood of detention. Could participation in market activities serve to overcome 
barriers to collective action? To what extent might the market itself become the locus of overt political 
conflict with the government? 
Survey responses depict relatively low levels of collective action among traders. When asked whether 
traders cooperated with each other, the share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing ranged from 
32 to 42 percent across the four time periods with no perceptible trend. Likewise, when asked whether 
traders in the market were beginning to organize to protect their interests, the affirmative response rate 
was 28 to 29 percent in all time periods—implicit evidence of the continuing atomization of North 
Korean society. 
However the share of household income derived from market sources is correlated with the 
respondent reporting joking about and speaking freely about the government among peers at the 5 and 
10 percent significance level, respectively. The regime’s discomfort with the emergence of the market and 
its potential as a sphere of activity autonomous from the state may be well founded.  1
Despite limited overt political action—even political communication—a striking feature of the 
survey is the very high share of respondents (71 percent) engaged in private trading. To get a better 
picture of the emerging political economy, we asked questions about the most effective route to power 
and wealth in North Korea. When asked the best way to “get ahead” in North Korea, 80 percent 
answered being a member of officialdom (including both government and party), which trumped by a 
substantial margin either the military or engaging in business. The share citing “engaging in business” 
more than doubled from 8 percent among respondents departing in the famine era to 16 percent for 
those leaving in the post-2005 era, with this shift coming almost completely at the expense of joining the 
military. 
When asked “what is the easiest way to make money in North Korea”—work hard at assigned 
job; engage in market activities; engage in corrupt or criminal activities; or  none of the above”—the 
most frequent response was that engaging in market activities was the easiest way to make money (67 
percent of those who left North Korea post-retrenchment period). But a steadily increasing share—more 
than one-quarter in the post-2005 cohort—saw corruption and criminality as the most lucrative career 
path. There is no sense that fidelity is rewarded; only a very small—and falling—share reported that 
working hard at your assigned job yielded fruit (4 percent of those who left during the famine era to 2 
percent of those who left during the post-retrenchment period). Official position was seen as valuable by 
respondents not because merit or diligence is rewarded, but because it enables the pursuit of business and 
corrupt or criminal rent extraction.
CoNCluSIoN: A model of eCoNomIC CrIme ANd PuNIShmeNT IN NorTh KoreA
The refugee literature provides a much more eloquent testimony to the abusive nature of the North 
Korean system than anything we can add here. However, this brief review of the development of the 
criminal and penal system and evidence from two surveys does shed some additional light on the nature 
of crime and punishment in North Korea. First, the development of the legal system exhibits what appear 
to be contradictory trends. There is a marginal increase in legalization, in the sense of incorporating 
basic legal protections into statute, and a relaxation in the treatment of some crimes related to economic 
survival. The best documented example of this forbearance is the legal treatment of border crossing, which 
has been demoted from the equivalent of treason to a misdemeanor offense for those showing no political 
motive and avoiding contact with “depraved” foreign culture. 
Yet at the same time, the range of economic activities deemed criminal has expanded dramatically. 
Also apparent is the institutionalization of “labor training” as a means of dealing with these and other 
low-level crimes. These two trends can be reconciled by noting that the government maintains a very 
high level of discretion; whatever the law says, the security apparatus is capable of making adjustments in 1
detention and incarceration with few checks on its authority. One might expect an uptick in detention 
and incarceration whenever the government is intent on checking market activity, as it has been since 
2005 in particular (Haggard and Noland 2010b). 
The statistical analysis of detention experiences suggests that those involved in market activities are 
more than half again as likely to be incarcerated. The penal system subjects these detainees to horrific 
conditions in an attempt to keep them atomized and quiescent; a major finding of our paper is that 
conditions in lower-level penal facilities approximates in several measurable ways conditions in facilities 
designed to house felons and even the most dangerous political prisoners. Of course, incarceration in 
political penal-labor camps and penitentiaries carries much longer sentences, and many prisoners end up 
dying in them. Yet it is nonetheless surprising that among our respondents, there was very little difference 
in the propensity to witness extreme forms of violence and deprivation in the notorious kwan-li-so penal-
labor camps and penitentiaries than there was in the lowest-level detention or labor training facility. 
In combination, these findings provide insight into the centrality of discretion and terror to 
the maintenance of the North Korean regime’s power. Obviously, authoritarian regimes have strong 
incentives to mete out particularly harsh punishment for those posing overt political challenges. But in 
a fraying socialist system, individuals are, out of necessity, thrown into a variety of market-like activities 
that are beyond the state’s control. The regime has maintained—and perhaps even expanded—its 
discretion to arrest, detain, and terrorize those engaged in market-oriented activities and appears to treat 
them as harshly as they do either common criminals or the most dangerous counterrevolutionaries. 
Such a system obviously has the effect of sowing fear. “Labor training” has the additional benefit 
of constituting a form of corvée labor or tax. But this pattern of detention may also have an additional 
economic motivation. Our surveys provide evidence of an increase in corruption in North Korea; in the 
post-retrenchment period, fully 85 percent of respondents reported that they needed to pay bribes to 
engage in market activity. High levels of discretion with respect to arrest and sentencing and very high 
costs of detention, arrest, and incarceration have the effect of increasing bribe costs. The more arbitrary 
and painful the experience with the penal system, the easier it is for officials to extort money for avoiding 
it. As a result, these features of the penal system may not only serve the objective of regime maintenance 
through intimidation, but could provide incentives and opportunities for the corruption of the internal 
security apparatus as well. Corruption may act as a safety valve in a fraying socialist system; a means of 
maintaining support among cadre by providing them access to economic rents. But predation on the part 
of underpaid officials can also generate a divergence between the policy interests of the government and 
the private interests of its officials. This divergence could create substantial risks for the regime over the 
longer run, as repression is harnessed not to ideological objectives—however cynically those are already 
viewed—but to private gain by government, party, and internal security functionaries.1
Table 1     Types of crimes and corresponding place of detention
Category 
Correctional centers designated location
unlimited term limited term labor training
Anti-state, anti-people crimes Conspiracy to overturn the state  Conspiracy to overturn the state  —
(1 types)  ( types) (1 types)
Crimes disruptive to national 
defense systems 
—  Neglecting preparedness for 
wartime production 
Neglecting preparedness for 
wartime production 
 (1 types) (1 types)  (10 types)
Crimes injurious to socialist 
economy 
Taking or robbing state 
properties 
Stealing or robbing state 
properties 
Stealing or robbing state 
properties 
(10 types)   ( types) ( types)  ( types) 
Crimes injurious to socialist 
culture 
Smuggling historical relics 
and smuggling and selling of 
narcotics 
Importing and spreading 
depraved culture 
Importing and spreading 
depraved culture
( types)  ( types)  ( types)   (1 types) 
Crimes injurious to administrative 
systems 
—  Collective disturbance; 
interfering with official business 
Interfering with official business; 
creation or dissemination of 
false information
( types) (0 types)   ( types) 
Crimes harmful to socialist 
collective life 
—  Acts of hoodlumism or 
racketeering 
Acts of hoodlumism or 
racketeering 
 (0 types) (1 types)  (1 types) 
Crimes injuring life or damaging 
property of citizens 
Willful murder or kidnapping  Willful murder  Excessive self-defense
( types)  ( types)  ( types)   (1 types) 
Source: Korean Institute for National Unification’s White Papers on Human Rights in North Korea 100, Table -. 1
Table 2     The North Korean prison system: an overview
facility Supervising institution offenses
Prosecutorial process 
and sentencing
Number in 2008 sample 
(n=300; number 
incarcerated=103). 
Numbers do not sum to 




National Security Agency 
(Bureau )
Serious political and 
ideological crimes, but 
also imprisonment of 
suspect categories
High level of NSA 
discretion; life sentences, 
including for extended 
family; confiscation of 
property
 (. percent of those 
incarcerated)
Kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries People’s Security Agency In addition to criminal 
felonies, serious crimes 
disruptive of national 
defense, injurious to 
the socialist economy, 
injurious to socialist 
culture, injurious to 
administration and 
harmful to socialist 
collective life 
Trial and court 
sentencing; “limited” 
terms of 1 to 1 years 
and “unlimited” terms of 





People’s Security Agency More serious 
misdemeanors and 
economic crimes, 
including theft of state 
property, spreading 
“depraved culture,” some 
border crossing
Trial and court sentenc-
ing; sentences of six 




People’s Security Agency, 
operated at county or 
municipal level
In addition to lower-level 
crimes, an expansive 
number of economic 
crimes, violations of 
labor administration and 
rules governing socialist 
culture
Initially ad hoc 
rehabilitation facilities; 
institutionalized 
with 00 revision of 
the penal code and 
expanded use of “labor 
training” as punishment; 




Table 3     detainment by bo–wi–bu or an–jeon–bu polices in North Korea  
  (probit arrested=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arrest: detained by either bo–wi–bu or an–jeon–bu police
Class: wavering 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0*
–0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Private activity 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.0*** 0.***
–0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.11
Occupation: professional –0.** –0.0** –0.** –0.1**
–0. –0. –0. –0.
Occupation: housewife –1.10*** –1.10*** –1.11*** –1.10***
–0.1 –0. –0. –0.1
Occupation: laborer –0.1*** –0.*** –0.*** –0.1***
–0.11 –0.1 –0.1 –0.11
Work unit: August rd unit  0.* 0.* 0.00* 0.*
–0. –0. –0. –0.
Work unit: army 0.* 0.* 0.* 0.1*
–0. –0. –0.1 –0.
Education: post college 1.0** 1.** 1.** 1.11**
–0. –0. –0. –0.
Left North Korea post–reform period –0.1
     (00~) –0.1
Left North Korea post–judicial reform –0.1
     (00~) –0.1
Left North Korea post–retrenchment period 0.0
     (00~) –0.1
Constant –0.*** –0.0*** –0.*** –0.***
–0.0 –0.1 –0.11 –0.0
Observations 00 00 00 00
Pseudo R–squared 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.11
Log likelihood –11. –10. –11.1 –11.
Chi–squared . .1 .1 .1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.0, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source:  Authors’ calculations.0




Less than 1 week Frequency 1  11 10
Percent . . 1. 0.1
Less than 1 month Frequency 0 1 1 1
Percent 0 11.11 . .
Less than 1 year Frequency 1   0
Percent . . . 0.
Between 1 and  years Frequency 1   
Percent . . . .0
More than  years Frequency 0 1 0 0
Percent 0 11.11 0 0
Total Frequency    
Percent 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 5     experiences of violence in the North Korean prison system (share of those imprisoned in  




N=3 N=9 N=68 N=49
While you were detained or imprisoned did you see with your own eyes:
Executions . . 0. .
Forced starvation . . .1 .
Death from being tortured or beaten . . . 0.1












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper draws on two refugee surveys. Neither of these surveys was random; neither we nor anyone else 
know the underlying characteristics of the refugee population, and cluster-type techniques used in other 
contexts to correct for these problems were infeasible. Nonetheless, a comparison of the composition of 
the survey with underlying demographic characteristics of the country and what we know about patterns 
of egress suggests that the two surveys are probably a reasonable reflection of the North Korean refugee 
population. The Chang, Haggard, and Noland survey of 1,346 refugees was conducted from August 
2004 to September 2005 at 11 sites in China by 48 individuals trained by one of the authors before 
conducting the interviews (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2009a).9 Most of the respondents were prime 
age adults, with a median age of 38 years and females slightly outnumbering males (52 to 48 percent). 
As in other surveys, members of lower-income classes and residents of the northeast provinces were both 
overrepresented.10 Most respondents were laborers (54 percent), with farmers (34 percent) the next largest 
occupational group. Most respondents were from North Hamgyong province (57 percent), followed 
by South Hamgyong province (19 percent); these two provinces both felt the brunt of the famine and 
are geographically proximate to the border. Although this distribution of responses actually makes these 
provinces somewhat less overrepresented than in earlier surveys, these provinces account for only about 
23 percent of the North Korean population (United Nations Population Fund 2009). 
The survey of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea was conducted in November 
2008. Again, the overwhelming majority of the second survey was prime age adults, with just over half 
between the ages of 35 and 50, and a larger majority than in the Chinese survey accounted for by women 
(63.3 percent). Residents of the northeast provinces were again overrepresented, with North Hamgyong 
province accounting for 50 percent of respondents followed by South Hamgyong province with 14.7 
percent. It is important to underscore, however, that while this overweighting of the northeast limits 
the conclusions that can be drawn from the sample with respect to the North Korean population as a 
whole, it does not necessarily present a problem for drawing inferences about the North Korean refugee 
communities in China and South Korea, which almost certainly are similarly skewed.
The occupational status of the respondents in the second survey is complicated somewhat by 
the large number of women in the sample; 52, or 17.3 percent of respondents, report that they are 
housewives. If we look only at those in the economically active population—excluding housewives, 
students and retirees (73 respondents, or just under one quarter of the sample)—the largest category 
9. The sites in China were: Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Yangbin, Tumen, Helong, Hunchun, Dandong, Jilin, 
Tonghua, and Wangqing.
10. See also Robinson, W. Courtland et al. (1999, 2001a, and 2001b), Lee et al. (2001), Chon et al. (2007), Lee (2007), 
Kim and Song (2008), and Lee et al. (2008).
among those in the workforce is laborers (40.1 percent), followed by government (18.9 percent), and 
merchants (7.9 percent, with nearly two-thirds of those women); the occupational distribution of the 
South Korea survey thus differs somewhat from the China survey and is more diverse. However, a closer 
inspection reveals that a substantial share of those listing their profession as laborers in fact work on 
collective farms or cooperatives, resulting in an occupational mix that is closer to the Chinese survey than 
it first appears. 
With respect to political classification, the bulk of respondents were categorized as “wavering” (61.7 
percent) with 11 percent “hostile” and 13.7 percent reporting that they did not know. Nonetheless, 13.7 
percent reported being in the “core” group, suggesting that even privileged political status did not provide 
benefits adequate to deter migration. 
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